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THE PLUMPY’NUT PREDICAMENT: IS COMPULSORY LICENSING
A SOLUTION?
Umar R. Bakhsh∗
INTRODUCTION
Ready-to-use therapeutic foods (RUTFs) are nutritional products that are high in
energy and protein and are enhanced with vitamins and minerals designed specifically to
treat different forms of malnutrition.1 RUTFs have several known applications, however,
chief amongst them is the use of RUTFs to treat malnutrition in children or to supplement
the diets of elderly patients with special nutritional requirements.2 RUTFs can be made
with a mixture of different proteins, carbohydrates, and fats and can potentially be
manufactured without using water, which prevents spoilage.3 Shelf longevity and the
ability to consume without cooking provide the key benefits of RUTFs.4
Over the past twenty years, RUTFs have become increasingly important in the
global hunger context.5 The United Nations (UN) estimates that almost one-third of
children in developing countries are malnourished, with malnourishment causing over
40% of the eleven million yearly deaths of children under the age of five in these
countries.6 Malnourishment is defined as a state of being poorly nourished and is a result
of insufficient caloric intake combined with a deficiency of protein and nutrients.7 Of
particular geographic interest is Sub-Saharan Africa, where more than 42% of children
suffer from moderate to severe malnourishment, with this number projected to increase to
over 50% by 2025.8 The effect on children in Sub-Saharan Africa is amplified by low
government effectiveness, violent conflicts, and rampant poverty. 9 However,
* I would like to thank the Chicago-Kent Journal of Intellectual Property Editors for their help and
Professor Chris Seaman for his invaluable contributions and assistance with this Article. And, of course,
many thanks to my parents, Mr. Sheikh Rahim and Mrs. Noorussabah Bakhsh for their never-ending
support and love.
1
Steve Collins, Community Therapeutic Care: A New Approach to Managing Acute Malnutrition in
Emergencies and Beyond, Food and Nutritional Technical Assistance, Technical Note No. 8, June 2004.
2
S. Isanaka, Effect of preventive supplementation with ready-to-use-therapeutic food on the nutritional
status, mortality and morbidity of children 6 to 60 months in Niger: a cluster randomized trial, J. AM. MED.
ASSOC., Jan. 21, 2009; 301(3): 277–285.
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
Doctors Without Borders, DWB Calls for Increased Use of Nutrient Dense RUTF to Save Malnourished
Children’s Lives, Oct. 10, 2007, available at http://www.worldhunger.org/ articles/07/global/doctors.htm.
6
World Hunger Education Service, 2011 World Hunger and Poverty Facts and Statistics, available at
http://www.worldhunger.org/articles/Learn/world%20hunger%20facts% 202002.htm.
7
UNICEF, Malnutrition: The Big Picture, available at http://www.unicef.org/nutrition/
index_bigpicture.html
8
UNICEF, Fighting Malnutrition to Save Lives, available at http://www.unicefusa.org/work/ nutrition/.
9
Id.
∗
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malnourishment is a condition that can consistently be treated successfully by an
adequate diet for a period of approximately six months.10 RUTFs satisfy the nutritional
requirements for a diet adequate to combat malnutrition and as such, are an essential tool
against global hunger.11
Plumpy’Nut is a RUTF that was developed by French pediatrician Andre Briend
in 1996. 12 At the time, Briend was working for Institut de Recherche pour le
Développement, a research institute that was collaborating with another French
corporation, Nutriset, on a project to develop a commercially viable treatment
specifically for malnutrition.13 After several failed trials, Plumpy’Nut was developed
using a blend of peanut butter, powdered milk, sugar, and oil and is fortified with
vitamins and minerals.14
Over the past five years, Plumpy’Nut has transformed the treatment of
malnourishment.15 Plumpy’Nut quickly developed a reputation as a cure to malnutrition
during the 2005 food crisis in Niger.16 This food crisis was the first time Plumpy’Nut was
mass distributed as a solution to malnutrition.17 It was during this first distribution that
Plumpy’Nut garnered excellent reviews and rocketed to worldwide popularity, with nonprofit organizations labeling the RUTF a “wonder product,” “silver bullet,” and “life
saver.”18 Since then, Plumpy’Nut has maintained approximately 90% of the market share
of RUTFs.19 Among the novel characteristics of Plumpy’Nut that make it the RUTF of
choice for the UN and the World Health Organization (WHO) are that, unlike other
RUTFs, there is no need to mix the product with water before consumption, and it is also
the first RUTF with a solid texture.20 Additionally, Plumpy’Nut can be consumed without
supervision of a physician, which allows home treatment of malnutrition, easing the
backlog on overburdened local hospitals.21 Most importantly, Plumpy’Nut has a good
taste, making it desirable to children.22

10
11
12

Id.
Id.

Nutriset,
Plumpy’Nut,
available
at
http://www.nutriset.fr/en/product-range/produit-parproduit/plumpynut-ready-to-use-therapeutic-food-rutf.html.
13
Nutriset, Plumpy’Nut Timeline, available at http://www.nutriset.fr/en/about-nutriset/nutrisettimeline.html.
14
Id.
15
Id.
16
Hugh Schofield, Legal Fight Over Plumpy’Nut, the Hunger Wonder-Product, (8 April 2010), available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/8610427.stm.
17
Id.
18
Id.
19
Id.
20
Id.
21
Id. (stating "In 2002 it took 2,000 staff to treat 10,000 children during a famine in Angola. In Niger we
needed just 150 staff for the same number of patients. Thanks to Plumpy’Nut, mass treatment is suddenly
possible.").
22
Id.
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After the formula for Plumpy’Nut was developed, Nutriset immediately pursued
patent protection in France.23 Since 1997, Plumpy’Nut has been patented in thirty-eight
countries, including much of Africa. 24 Nutriset has also aggressively protected its
intellectual property, and because of this, the private company has been able to place a
stranglehold on the RUTF market.25 However, Nutriset has been unable to manufacture
enough Plumpy’Nut to satisfy its growing demand from non-profit organizations and
initially refused to license others to use the technology.26 Nutriset currently possesses
neither the production capacity nor the resources to expand production capacity to fill
current standing orders of Plumpy’Nut. 27 Instead, the company has focused on its
franchising system or else resorted to licensing strictly in countries where there is no
patent protection or locations where the raw material costs make mass production
impractical.28 As a result, some children who suffer from malnutrition are unable to
receive Plumpy’Nut in a timely fashion, and non-profit organizations that want to order
additional quantities are limited by Nutriset’s production capabilities.29 Finally, Nutriset
has also taken legal action to prevent other non-profit organizations from manufacturing,
transporting, or even storing similar and cheaper RUTFs, despite the strong international
demand.30
This Article suggests that in certain legislatively defined humanitarian instances,
the United States government should issue compulsory licenses for patented technology
in order to benefit non-domestic populations that may otherwise be disastrously affected.
Specifically, by reapplying currently used principles from pharmaceutical and
agricultural patents to food-related patents, and by implementing a novel compensation
scheme, issues in which a patentee is unable or unwilling to license a patent can be
compelled to do so while still benefitting from their patented technology. Legislation of
this kind would still fall within the guidelines of the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property (TRIPS) agreement, of which the U.S. is a signatory. Part II of this article
investigates compulsory licenses in intellectual property generally, as well as antitrust
provisions relevant to compulsory licensing. Part III discusses the merits of the
Plumpy’Nut patent protection and antitrust concerns. Part IV explains compulsory
licensing under TRIPS and its subsequent effects on intellectual property. Finally, Part V
23

Andrew
Rice,
The
Peanut
Solution,
(2
September
2010),
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/05/magazine/05Plumpy-t.html?pagewanted=all.
24
Id.
25
Id. (stating Nutriset has taken legal action even in states where there has not been manufacture, rather
only storage or transit, even when there is no patent in the export or destination state, preventing the
buildup of any reserve supply).
26
Sasha S. Rao, Improving Access to Patented Humanitarian Products Via TRIPS: A Study of the
Plumpy'Nut Problem, 15 MICH. ST. U. J. MED. & L. 111, 113-114 (2010) (stating Plumpy’Nut can be
manufactured locally due to its simple process and use of raw materials that are available in most
developing counties. The principal cost is the raw materials themselves. Nutriset has franchised some
manufacturers to produce Plumpy’Nut. The output from these facilities is for situations or orders that
require less than 50 tons of Plumpy’Nut annually. However, the franchisee must buy the vitamins,
minerals, and additives directly from Nutriset.).
27
Id.
28
Id. at 114.
29
Id.
30
Id. at 115.
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argues for reapplication of certain compulsory patent licensing guidelines to food patents,
under certain circumstances.
I. LICENSING IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
Licenses are commonplace in intellectual property and are simply contracts
between the owner of the intellectual property, who becomes the licensor, and a second
party, the licensee.31 License agreements have varying scope and each party is free to
negotiate the terms of the contractual agreement.32 A license, however, cannot grant
rights exceeding the rights of the intellectual property owner; a party cannot license more
rights than it possesses.33 Generally speaking, in U.S. patent and copyright law, the owner
of intellectual property has an exclusive right to their intellectual property and maintains
complete control over any licensing.34 However, in some instances, the U.S. government
has granted compulsory, or statutory, licenses.35 A compulsory license is an involuntary
contract between a willing licensee and an unwilling licensor.36 These licenses are used in
copyright and patent law.37 At times, this compulsory license is mandated due to antitrust
law and regulations.38
A. Compulsory Licensing in Copyright Law
Compulsory licenses in copyright law allow a party to use a copyrighted work
without the permission of the copyright owner. 39 Use of the copyrighted work is
regulated by the U.S. Copyright Act and is subject to a standardized royalty. 40 A
compulsory license in copyright law grants the licensee only the right to use the
copyrighted material, not to distribute or reproduce it.41
In creating a compulsory license scheme in federal copyright law, the U.S.
Congress aimed to balance the interests of authors, distributors, and the general public.42
Additionally, the implementation of compulsory licenses has allowed the law to keep
pace with technology.43 There are three primary public policy reasons for compulsory
licenses in copyright law: 1) to assist public dissemination and author compensation; 2)
31

Mixing Equipment Co. v. Innova-Tech, Inc., 228 U.S.PQ.. 221, 224 (E.D.Pa.1985).
Peter Maybarduk, Compulsory Licenses: A Tool to Improve Global Access to the HPV Vaccine? 35 AM.
J.L. & MED. 323, 325 (2009).
33
Id.
34
Id.
35
See, e.g., id.
36
Id.
37
Id.
38
Id.
39
Jethro Dean, Would You Like to Play Again? Saving Classic Video Games From Virtual Extinction
Through Statutory Licensing, 35 SW. U. L. REV. 405, 419 (2006).
40
Id.
41
Id.
42
Jason Rooks, Constitutionality of Judicially Imposed Compulsory Licenses in Copyright Infringement
Cases, 3 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 255, 258 (1995).
43
Id.
32
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to avoid past market failure; and 3) to reduce free riding. 44 Compulsory licensing
eliminates the need for individual licensing between the copyright owner and an
interested licensee and facilitates timely distribution of a copyrighted work, while
ensuring that the author is compensated in some manner.45 Before compulsory licensing,
the market allowed owners and licensees to contract with each other; however, this
system proved unstable and led to situations in which parties were licensing identical
works at different costs, and copyright enforceability became difficult due to inconsistent
judicial determinations. 46 Finally, with modern technology, free riding has made it
difficult to enforce copyright protection because copyrighted works can be distributed
quickly over the internet.47 Compulsory licenses assist in this regard by ensuring that the
required license fee encourages users to obtain the compulsory license rather than
infringe the copyright, thereby reducing free riding.48
B. Compulsory Licensing in Patent Law
Patents are generally the strongest form of intellectual property protection.49 The
principal goals of the United States patent system are to encourage innovation, urge
disclosure, and promote manufacture.50 In exchange for disclosing an invention that is
useful, novel, and non-obvious, the patentee is granted a limited exclusive right to
exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention for a period
of twenty years from the date of filing.51 An inventor may commercialize the invention or
may choose not to, but can prevent others from using any part of the technology.52
Essentially, a patent is a limited term monopoly that rewards an inventor for their
innovation.53
Accordingly, compulsory licensing has found little support in patent law, other
than as a remedy to an antitrust violation.54 Any form of compulsory licensing is thought
to negatively affect the policy goals of patent law by reducing security in the investment
in developing new technology and subsequently obtaining patent protection and also by
reducing the incentive to innovate, particularly in a field where compulsory licensing is
an option.55 Rather than developing new technology independently, a party could wait
until someone else developed it, and then, if the invention was commercially successful,

44

Id.
Id.
46
Id.
47
Id. at 269-270.
48
Id.
49
See Kurt Saunders, Patent Nonuse and the Role of Public Interest as a Deterrent to Technology
Suppression, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 389, 426 (2002).
50
Gianna Julian-Arnold, International Compulsory Licensing: The Rationales and the Reality, 33 IDEA
349, 357 (1993).
51
Id.
52
Id.
53
See Saunders, supra note 49, at 426.
54
Id. at 430-431.
55
Id.
45
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the party could obtain a compulsory license and enter the market without investing in the
research.56
However, patent protection is not unlimited.57 For example, patents reading on
standards-essential technology and patents owned by members of standards-setting
organizations are generally subject to licensing at reasonable and non-discriminatory
(RAND) terms, in order to facilitate the design of compatible products and
interoperability of devices manufactured by different manufacturers. 58 Additionally,
compulsory licensing in the patent context has been addressed by the United States
legislature.59 In 28 U.S.C. 1498(a), the U.S. government is given the authority to use, or
to authorize a third party to use, any issued U.S. patent.60 In exchange for this unlicensed
use, the patentee is entitled to just compensation.61
The U.S. government has taken advantage of this statute on different occasions.62
In the Clean Air Act, the government utilized this authority by permitting compulsory
licensing whenever the Attorney General finds that an otherwise unavailable patent is
needed to accomplish the goals of the Act, and there is no reasonable alternative.63
Similarly, the Atomic Energy Act allows compulsory licensing if the license would be in
the interest of the public.64 Other instances include the Plant Protection Act and the BayhDole Act, which respectively allow compulsory licensing when it is necessary to ensure
an adequate supply of food or when the technology is the result of federally funded
research. 65 However, the provisions of these Acts have been interpreted narrowly,
indicating a policy avoiding the use of compulsory licensing whenever possible.66
C. Antitrust Law and Patents
Antitrust law aims to encourage competition, improve economic efficiency, and
limit activity interfering with the normal effects of supply and demand in the free
market.67 There is an inherent tension between patent law and antitrust law; while one
grants a temporary monopoly and can potentially confer monopoly power on the
patentee, the other seeks to eliminate monopolies.68 However, the interplay between a
patent and monopoly power is not an automatic process.69 Likewise, a monopoly is not an
56

Id. (referring to this behavior as the “wait and see approach”).
George Tsai, Canada's Access to Medicines Regime: Lessons for the Compulsory Licensing Schemes
Under the WTO Doha Declaration, 49 VA. J. INT'L L. 1063, 1063 (2009).
58
See Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights and Standard-Setting Organizations, 90 CAL. L. REV.
1889, 1896 (2002).
59
See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §1498. (2011)
60
Julian-Arnold, supra note 50, at 352.
61
See Motorola, Inc. v. United States, 729 F.2d 765, 772 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
62
Saunders, supra note 49 at 435.
63
42 U.S.C. §7608 (1994).
64
Id. §2138(a) (1999).
65
Saunders, supra note 49, at 446.
66
Id.
67
Arnold Calmann, Understanding the Intellectual Property License, 915 PLI/Pat 449, 465 (2007).
68
Saunders, supra note 49 at 431.
69
Id.
57
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automatic violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act, a provision that regulates
monopolies in antitrust law.70
The key difference in a monopoly created by a patent compared to a monopoly in
the antitrust context is that patented technologies may compete with each other, thereby
constraining monopoly pricing. 71 In other words, a patented technology can be
substitutable.72 Therefore, a patent only confers monopoly power on the patentee in the
antitrust sense when there are no substitutes for the patented product.73 As a result, when
a patentee refuses to license a patent, this behavior is anticompetitive only when it creates
or extends monopoly power in the relevant marketplace.74
Section 2 of the Sherman Act regulates monopolization.75 In order to violate the
statute, a party must have monopoly power in the relevant market and must also exhibit
monopoly conduct.76 A critical step in determining whether a Section 2 violation has
occurred is determining what the relevant market is.77 Courts have used factors such as
the substitutability of the product or supplier as well as the geographical market.78
Monopoly power has been generally defined as 75% of market share in the relevant
market, although this is considered on a sliding scale when there are significant barriers
to enter the market.79 Finally, monopoly conduct is fact specific and guided by case
law.80
II. THE PLUMPY’NUT PATENT
There are three primary types of patents: utility, design, and plant.81 Patents on
foods fall under the utility category, as utility patents cover processes, machines, articles
of manufacture, or compositions of matter.82 In order to be patentable, foods still need to
meet the normal requirements of patentability.83 This creates an additional hurdle for
culinary patents, as utility patents are not generally granted for simple recipes; rather, to
obtain a patent a food must be new and non-obvious in view of other recipes.84 However,
if a food meets these requirements, it is patentable under U.S. patent law.85
70

Robin C. Feldman, The Insufficiency of Antitrust Analysis for Patent Misuse, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 399, 401
(2003).
71
Saunders, supra note 49, at 431-432.
72
See id.
73
Id. at 431.
74
35 U.S.C. §271(d)(4) (1994) (rationale for this rule lies in the belief that the primary social utility of a
patent is in the disclosure of an invention rather than commercialization).
75
15 U.S.C §2 (1890).
76
Feldman, supra note 70 at 401.
77
See, e.g., Image Tech. Servs. V. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195 (9th Cir. 1997).
78
See id.
79
See id.
80
See id.
81
Emily Cunningham, Protecting Cuisine Under the Rubric of Intellectual Property: Should the Law Play
a Bigger Role in the Kitchen?, 9 J. HIGH TECH. L. 21, 23 (2009).
82
Id.
83
Id.
84
Id. at 25.
85
Id.
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Plumpy’Nut has been patented in the United States.86 The ‘284 patent contains a
single independent claim directed to a
complete food or nutritional supplement which contains at most 10% by weight
of water, develops an osmolality of less than 100 mOsm/kg after immersion in
four times its own volume of water and is stable to oxidation, comprising a
mixture of food-grade products, said mixture being coated with at least one lipidrich substance derived from oleaginous seeds and being enriched in vitamins,
soluble or insoluble mineral salts, enzymes or mixtures thereof.87

The patent has been criticized as being potentially invalid because it seems overly broad
as well as obvious in light of prior recipes.88 Critics of the Plumpy’Nut patent argue that
it covers essentially any nut-based RUTF paste and is thus impossible to design around,
while others argue that the patent has essentially conferred monopoly power on Nutriset
and thus violated the Sherman Act.89
A. Should the ‘284 Patent Be Held Invalid?
Two non-profit organizations, Mama Cares Foundation and Breedlove Foods, Inc.
have unsuccessfully attempted to bring legal action against the ‘284 patent for
invalidity. 90 The primary argument for invalidity in this instance is that the single
independent claim in the ‘284 patent is overly broad.91 While broad claims are patentable,
these claims are susceptible to challenge on novelty grounds.92 The relevant statutes of
the Patent Act are Sections 102 and 103.93 Section 102 prevents patenting an invention
that already exists or is described in prior art, and Section 103 prohibits patenting a claim
that would be obvious, in light of prior disclosures, to someone having ordinary skill in
the art.94 Courts have employed a four factor test in determining non-obviousness: 1) the
scope and content of the prior art; 2) the differences between the current claim and the
prior art; 3) the level of ordinary skill in the art; and 4) any other objective evidence of
non-obviousness.95

86

U.S. Patent No. 6,346,284.
Id.
88
Rice, supra note 23, (2 Sept. 2010).
89
Id.
90
Rao, supra note 26, at 114 (arguing that due to procedural difficulties and the risk of being counter sued
for patent infringement, the organizations are headed towards an unsuccessful legal battle and have pursued
other options, such as developing an open source formula).
91
Id. (stating the broad scope impacts the cost, quality, and security of the supply chain for RUTFs. Patent
allows Nutriset to essentially limit the number of providers, and also precludes aid organizations from
finding similar products that may be cheaper, in greater reserve, or of better quality.)
92
Cunningham, supra note 81, at 23.
93
Rao, supra note 26 at 119-120.
94
Sandra Schmeider, Scope of Biotechnology Inventions in the United States and in Europe - Compulsory
Licensing, Experimental Use and Arbitration: A Study of Patentability of DNA-Related Inventions with
Special Emphasis on the Establishment of an Arbitration Based Compulsory Licensing System, 21 SANTA
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 163, 183 (2004).
95
Rao, supra note 26, at 120.
87
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Section 102 does not apply to the instant case because there is no prior art
describing the specific formula of Plumpy’Nut.96 The four factors used to determine
obviousness in Section 103, however, have stronger applicability. 97 The scope and
content of prior art will be large and voluminous, including all prior RUTFs designed to
treat malnourishment.98 The differences between the claim here and the prior art are
slightly more difficult to distinguish.99 The claim is specific in defining a composition of
acceptable products, yet it is broad in that it allows use of any oleaginous seed and all
vitamins.100 This differentiates the claim from the prior art by proportion and composition
of nutrients, and potentially by whether the product is in liquid or solid form.101 Because
of this, it is likely that it will be unique when compared in totality to the prior art.102 The
ordinary skill in the art is presumably low, as the product uses common household
materials and staple ingredients, and can be made in a household kitchen.103 However,
considering the objective factors of non-obviousness, the commercial success that
Plumpy’Nut has enjoyed indicates that the claim is not obvious.104 The commercial
success, combined with the initial perception of the inventors regarding the product’s
potential commercial success, weighs strongly against holding the claim obvious.105
Courts have discussed the weight of each of the four factors in analyzing Section
103.106 Following through the analysis, it would be up to a court to decide if the
commercial success and potential differences between the current claim and the prior art
outweigh what someone skilled in the art would have considered obvious, given the prior
art.107 However, a finding of invalidity may not solve the problem entirely.108 If the
patent were held invalid, this would only impact the U.S. patent.109 To get the same result
worldwide, legal action would have to be taken in each of the thirty-eight countries the
patent is granted in to accommodate for shipping and transport of the product.110 This
presents a sizeable legal undertaking and would require significant resources, time, and
investment on behalf of the parties involved.111

96

See id.
Id.
98
Id.
99
See id.
100
See id.
101
Id.
102
Id.
103
Id.
104
Id.
105
See id.
106
See, e.g., KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, 550 U.S. 398 (2007).
107
See Rao, supra note 26, at 121.
108
See id. at 124.
109
See id.
110
Id.
111
Id.
97
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B. Has the ‘284 Patent Conferred Monopoly Power on Nutriset?
If Nutriset has monopoly power in its relevant market, a finding of violation of
Section 2 of the Sherman Act could potentially follow.112 The ‘284 patent would only
confer monopoly power on Nutriset if there are no substitutable products.113 If the ‘284
patent confers monopoly power on Nutriset, then Nutriset would also have to engage in
monopoly conduct in order to violate Section 2 of the Sherman Act.114
The ‘284 patent has likely conferred monopoly power on Nutriset. 115 When
considering potential substitutable products, the specific advantages of Plumpy’Nut also
have to be considered.116 The substitute would have to have a shelf life of two years
without refrigeration, be fit for consumption without mixing with water, contain all of the
vitamins and minerals necessary for a full day, and have a pleasant taste while
maintaining a similar cost.117 There are currently no non-infringing products widely
available for substitution.118 The 10% of the market share Nutriset does not own consists
of RUTFs that have much shorter shelf lives, are substantially more expensive, or
otherwise require supervision of a physician and multiple daily doses.119 For example,
Meals-Ready-to-Eat (MRE), used by the American military, have a shelf life of three
years.120 However, they are not nutritionally composed to be consumed for more than
twenty-one days in a row, while a Plumpy’Nut cycle lasts for a period of over six
months.121 Also, because of expensive packaging requirements, each MRE costs the U.S.
government over $7, compared to just under $1 for each unit of Plumpy’Nut.122 Because
there are no substitutable products that do not infringe the ‘284 patent, the patent has
likely conferred monopoly power on Nutriset.123
Monopoly power alone does not create a legal cause of action.124 The monopoly
power must be in a relevant market, and monopoly conduct is required for a Sherman Act
violation.125 Defining a relevant market is a critical step in analyzing a Sherman Act
violation.126 Here, the market can be defined as the global market for RUTFs, of which
Nutriset has a 90% market share.127 Therefore, Nutriset has monopoly power in a relevant
112

See 15 U.S.C §2 (1890).
See Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006).
114
See generally id.
115
See id.
116
Sanjay Gupta, The Funny Sounding Nut Paste That’s Saving Children’s Lives in Somalia, CNN (Aug.
20, 2011), http://eatocracy.cnn.com/2011/08/10/plumpynut/.
117
Id.
118
CBSNews,
A
Life
Saver
Called
“Plumpynut”,
CBSNews
(Feb.
11,
2009),
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/10/19/60minutes/main3386661.shtml.
119
Id.
120
British Broadcasting Corporation, US Army’s Hi-Tech, Two Year Old Sandwich Served Fresh, BBC
(Dec. 5, 2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-environment-15987343.
121
Id.
122
Rice, supra note 23, (2 September 2010).
123
Id.
124
15 U.S.C §2 (1890).
125
Id.
126
See Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Machinery & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 177 (1965).
127
Rao, supra note 26, at 121.
113
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market.128 In addition to monopoly power in a relevant market, monopoly conduct is
required.129 Potential monopoly conduct could be the fact that Nutriset has refused to
license its technology.130 However, Section 271(d)(4) of the Patent Act states that “no
patent owner otherwise entitled to relief for infringement . . . shall be denied relief or
deemed guilty of misuse or illegal extension of the patent right by reason of
having…refused to license or use any rights to the patent.”131 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit has interpreted this statute, holding that refusals to license
a patent are per se lawful, as long as there is no illegal tying, fraud on the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office or sham litigation to enforce the patent.132 Refusal to license a patent,
therefore, does not constitute monopoly conduct and does not immediately give rise to an
antitrust violation.133 Accordingly, Nutriset’s behavior with the ‘284 patent likely does
not violate the Sherman Act.134
III. TRIPS
The Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS) is an international
agreement developed by the World Trade Organization (WTO) that outlines legal
standards that member nations are obligated to implement in their domestic legislation as
a requirement of membership.135 The United States is a founding member of the WTO
and an early signatory. 136 TRIPS was drafted with the goal of creating intellectual
property regulations that stress protection and exclusion rather than dissemination and
competition, and the regulations apply to all intellectual property systems.137 However,
one of the main objectives of TRIPS is to increase the flow of patented exports to
developing nations that are signatories of the agreement. 138 This is because by
guaranteeing the minimum level of intellectual property enforcement required
domestically by TRIPS, developed nations would have less concern and increased
incentive to provide these developing nations with patented products and technology.139
In certain instances, TRIPS allows member nations to grant compulsory licenses
for patented technology.140 In the Doha Declaration of 2001, these provisions of TRIPS
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were reinforced.141 The Doha Declaration was adopted as part of TRIPS primarily to
clarify the scope of the agreement and also to alleviate concerns of developing countries
that feared the agreement was being interpreted narrowly.142 In the Doha Declaration,
there are three paragraphs relevant to compulsory licensing of patented technology.143
Specifically, these paragraphs indicate that TRIPS does not aim to prevent member states
from taking measures to protect public health.144 Additionally, the paragraphs identify,
under the category of public health, access to essential medicines by all people as a
central goal of the Doha Declaration.145 In practice, the compulsory licensing provisions
of the Doha Declaration have been principally applied to pharmaceuticals and, to a lesser
extent, agriculture. 146 However, the provisions have been abused by some member
nations and have also been criticized as reducing the incentive to innovate.147
A. USE OF THE COMPULSORY LICENSING PROVISIONS OF TRIPS
Paragraph 4 of the Doha Declaration states that member states have the “right to
protect public health and, in particular, to promote access to medicines for all.” 148
Paragraph 5(b) of the Doha Declaration provides member states with the power to grant
compulsory licenses and also to determine the grounds upon which the license is to be
granted.149 Finally, Paragraph 5(c) limits the grant of compulsory licenses to situations of
national emergency or extreme urgency, but allows each individual state to independently
define the terms “national emergency” or “extreme urgency.”150 Accordingly, as the only
category of patented technology to be specifically mentioned in the Doha Declaration,
pharmaceuticals have been routinely subjected to compulsory licensing by member
states.151 To a lesser degree, compulsory licenses for agricultural products or processes
have also been issued by member states.152
Pharmaceuticals are patentable in almost every individual member state of
TRIPS.153 Pharmaceutical patents are important because they provide the primary form of
intellectual property protection for the developer and are often the only way the
developer can recover the sizable cost of development. 154 Compulsory licensing of
141
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pharmaceuticals can have a positive effect in a humanitarian perspective.155 By issuing a
third party a compulsory license, a government can greatly reduce the cost of
treatment. 156 For example, Malaysia issued compulsory licenses for three patented
Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) drugs in 2003.157 As a result, the cost of
AIDS treatment in the country was reduced 81%, reducing a monthly cost of $315 to
$58.158 This reduced cost in turn allowed Malaysia to triple the number of patients treated
for AIDS in government hospitals.159 Other developing countries, such as Indonesia,
Zimbabwe, and South Africa have also seen similar results after issuing compulsory
licenses.160 However, the use of compulsory licenses in developed countries has not
produced equal results.161
For example, Canada enacted a domestic statute entitled, “Canada’s Access to
Medicines Regime (CAMR),” which aimed to implement the compulsory licensing
provisions of the Doha Declaration.162 The statute aimed to create a system to export
generic drugs to developing countries via a compulsory license, while balancing the
commercial interests of the patent holder with broader humanitarian objectives. 163
However, the statute as enacted created minimal practical benefit as it offered generic
pharmaceutical manufacturers little incentive to produce medicines with a compulsory
license.164
As countries with significant generic pharmaceutical capabilities, Brazil and India
have been among the most active WTO member states in issuing compulsory licenses for
medicine.165 However, the practice in these countries has been to manufacture the drugs
not for their domestic population, but to export them to other developing countries that
may not have the production capabilities.166 Although this practice is technically legal
under TRIPS, the practice has come under fire as an abuse of the compulsory licensing
provision.167 The result of these practices is that the original manufacturer is unable to
sell the drug at a competitive cost and is ultimately unable to recover the investment in
developing the medicine.168 A tangential issue is that consumers of the drug in developed
countries are expected to pay an even higher price for the drug, in order for the original
manufacturer to combat the flooding of the market in developing countries with generic
products.169
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A second area of patented technology that is subjected to compulsory licensing is
agriculture, or biotechnology.170 However, the majority of biotechnology patents are not
effective in geographic areas that require them the most.171 For example, genetically
engineered seeds for corn or soybean that improve crop yield are of little benefit to
countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, where neither the climate nor infrastructure permit the
growth of corn or soybeans.172 Also, there is little incentive to innovate or design new
biotechnology geared towards a geographic market where the farmers will not be able to
provide compensation. 173 As a business consideration, designing products for SubSaharan Africa will not generally result in a high return on investment; the farmers in the
area are by no means wealthy.174 Agricultural patents are not subjected to compulsory
licensing as often as pharmaceuticals for another reason.175 In most cases, an agricultural
product may be covered by many patents, creating a patent thicket.176 For example, in
2000, a group of non-profit organizations attempted to free the technology used to grow
vitamin-enriched rice.177 In order to do so, the group had to clear over seventy patents
and licenses that were held by thirty-two organizations.178
Because food has a direct impact on public health, patented food products or
processes also fall within the potential compulsory licensing provisions of TRIPS.179
However, there are limited examples of compulsory licenses for patented foods being
granted by member states.180 Part of the reason is that food patents are small in number,
and when they exist, they cover novelty or special foods. 181 For many developing
countries, the desire or market for typical patented foods is slim, due to the fact that
populations may not even have sufficient access to staple, unpatented foods. 182
Additionally, granting a compulsory license for a patented food is generally not thought
to be a lucrative investment on behalf of the generic manufacturer, due to the low
demand.183
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B. The Effect of Compulsory Licensing Under TRIPS on the Incentive to Innovate
Intellectual property law is broadly premised on reward and incentive.184 The
theory of granting intellectual property rights to an individual or entity implies the belief
that reward for creativity is imperative to develop a cycle of continuous creativity and to
increase the amount of valuable knowledge in the public domain.185 Striking a balance
between the interests of an inventor or creator and the public domain is an ongoing
consideration when considering intellectual property rights, and particularly patent
law. 186 Within the patent context, an issued patent provides an inventor with the
possibility of commercial success.187 Accordingly, subjecting a patent to a compulsory
license seemingly divests the inventor of his or her intellectual property, as well as the
potential for commercial success, and therefore directly affects an inventor’s incentive to
innovate.188
The ability for individual states to define when a national emergency or situation
of extreme urgency occurs has led to instances of abuse of the TRIPS agreement.189
Member states have full discretion over the amount of compensation to the patentee for a
compulsory license, which creates an additional impact on the incentive to innovate.190
Because of this broad power given to each independent state, there is a substantial
discrepancy between the compensation awarded to the patentee.191 For example, some
states use a hypothetical negotiation standard, while others provide only token
compensation.192
One example of a member state that has issued compulsory pharmaceutical
licenses is Thailand.193 Considering the context of the Doha Declaration, the generally
accepted intent of the compulsory licensing provisions was to allow the compulsory
licensing of medicines that treated infectious diseases, as these diseases were rampant in
developing countries and generally led to death.194 However, the plain language of the
agreement includes all medicines.195 Some member states have utilized this fact to their
advantage and have been criticized as abusing the provision.196 For example, Thailand
has consistently issued compulsory licenses for medicines treating non-infectious
conditions, such as heart disease and cancer.197 For the purposes of TRIPS, Thailand is
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considered a middle-income country, drawing further ire from other member states.198
Finally, in granting compulsory licenses, Thailand has instituted a practice of issuing the
license with little prior warning and at a royalty rate of less than one percent of the total
sale price.199 This rate, at times only one-half percent, is generally calculated on a sale
price far below the market price at which the generic is sold, effectively destroying the
market for the original product.200
From an economic perspective, compulsory licensing in a field as lucrative as
pharmaceuticals can encourage manufacturers to adopt a wait-and-see approach rather
than focusing on developing new drugs.201 By eliminating the research and development
costs of new drugs, manufacturers can wait until a drug is discovered and patented by
another party and further wait and see if the drug is a commercial success.202 If so, the
manufacturer can subsequently begin mass production of the drug while relying on a
compulsory license from the patentee.203 Creating a clearly defined category of products
or other patented technology that may be subject to a compulsory license can combat
this.204 By providing this information in a clear manner, inventors will be aware of the
potential subjection to a compulsory license before they even obtain the patent.205 A
bright line standard is essential, however, to prevent this from becoming a tool of bad
faith for generic manufacturers that simply want to engage in the inventor’s business.206
IV. REAPPLICATION OF PHARMACEUTICAL COMPULSORY LICENSING TO
PLUMPY’NUT
Antitrust law is not a solution to the Plumpy’Nut problem because antitrust law
has not proven effective in cases where there is failure to license by a patentee.207
Additionally, it is unlikely that Nutriset has violated any of the antitrust laws in the
U.S. 208 The issued ‘284 patent, although broad, is likely valid and enforceable, so
Nutriset is under no obligation to license the technology to any party.209
TRIPS already includes a broad framework for when compulsory licensing is
acceptable.210 Although food falls within the realm of the safeguarding public interest
provision of TRIPS, its practical application has been limited primarily to agriculture, and
even then, the provision has been underutilized.211 As a signatory to the WTO, the United
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States is bound by TRIPS. 212 Accordingly, any domestic legislation involving
compulsory licensing of patents must fall within the guidelines set forth in the Doha
Declaration.213
The Plumpy’Nut patent is analogous to a pharmaceutical patent.214 Traditionally,
patents are thought to cover whole products, and lost profits or reasonable royalties
measure damages.215 With the rapid advancement of technology, these types of patents
have become the exception rather than the rule.216 For example, a handheld device such
as the Apple iPhone is covered by over 120 patents, with each individual component
potentially covered by several patents.217 These patents, covering a small invention that is
part of a larger product, have value essentially only as licensing tools because they are
not commercially useful independently.218 However, one area of technology where the
patent usually covers the entire product is pharmaceuticals.219 The entire compound is
covered in one patent, and the compound can be sold in product form.220 In this regard,
the Plumpy’Nut patent is like a pharmaceutical patent.221 The patent discloses a formula
that can be readily sold as a product, and a single patent covers the entire invention.222
Accordingly, provisions of TRIPS applying to pharmaceutical law should readily be
applied to food products such as Plumpy’Nut.223
In reapplying these principles to food products such as Plumpy’Nut, some of the
considerations that have affected the use of compulsory licensing in regards to
pharmaceuticals should be avoided.224 For example, the scope of legislation allowing
compulsory licenses should be narrowly defined to avoid the pitfall of pharmaceutical
compulsory licensing, in which any patented product is eligible.225 Also, the definition of
an eligible product should be defined rather than leaving it open to interpretation by
member states or countries.226 Such a limitation would reduce the potential for abuse that
occurs within the pharmaceutical field.227 Also, remuneration should be addressed in a
clear manner, eliminating the possibility of token compensation.228 While undertaking
these considerations, however, they cannot be so restrictive as to create a lengthy
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bureaucratic process when an unforeseen emergency arises.229 A structure that considers
these factors may encourage voluntary licensing because the licensor will be aware that a
potential licensee has the option of a compulsory license.230 In creating a scheme to
reapply these principles, both policy goals and practical issues should be considered.
A. Policy Considerations of Reapplication
In crafting legislation to allow compulsory licensing of a patent for the benefit of
a non-domestic population, there are several factors that should be considered. First, the
breadth of the patent must be considered.231 If a patent is overly broad, this factor should
weigh in favor of a compulsory license.232 If not, then this factor should weigh against
compulsory license due to the fact that potential licensees can design around the patent or
otherwise innovate a different solution. 233 To determine if a patent is broad, the
availability of substitutes should be considered.234
A second policy consideration is that the incentive or reward associated with
patents should remain intact.235 The original inventor is entitled to the rights to his or her
invention and should be compensated accordingly.236 To do otherwise will reduce the
incentive to innovate and potentially stymie the innovation that patent law seeks to
drive.237 This can be achieved by creating a clear and brightline standard for patents that
can potentially be subject to compulsory licensing.238 Rather than a broad category that is
open to differing interpretation, such as the public interest umbrella in TRIPS, a concise
definition of categories of patents and instances in which they will be subject to
compulsory licensing will allow an inventor to realize this before investing in research.239
Although this may limit innovation in these specific areas, a balance must be struck
between the needs of this statute and the policy goals of patent law.240 Plumpy’Nut is a
narrow scenario in which there is a single primary producer and that producer refuses to
license the patent, where the patent covers a technology vital to resolving a humanitarian
crisis.241 Another way in which this policy can be achieved is by temporarily suspending
the patent during the term of the compulsory license and then adding the length of the
term to the expiration date when the compulsory license expires.242 In the Plumpy’Nut
case, the ‘284 patent expires in 2017, leaving a relatively short length of time for Nutriset
229
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to profit on their invention.243 Because between 80-90% of patents never create any
monetary return, Nutriset should be adequately compensated for their efforts and
innovation.244
Enforcing patent rights should not be discouraged either. 245 However, in an
instance where a patent falls within the considerations of the proposed legislation, and the
patentee fails to license or negotiate in good faith, this provision should apply.246 The
global actions of the patentee should also be considered.247 For example, Nutriset owns
patents in some of countries where demand is highest, such as in Chad, Congo, Sudan,
Uganda, and Zimbabwe, creating a situation where no competitors can enter the
market. 248 Nutriset’s past litigation history also shows threats to enforce rights in
countries of transit and storage.249
Compulsory licensing has been used in the U.S. in the past, and the policy reasons
for allowing such use are also applicable in the instant situation.250 In copyright law,
compulsory licensing is allowed to balance the interests of authors and the public and to
ensure compensation to the author.251 Similarly, here, a compulsory license will balance
the needs of a developing country while ensuring the patentee is compensated. Likewise,
compulsory licensing for patents is not a new consideration.252 Compulsory licenses are
allowed for the benefit of the American public for non-life threatening situations,
accordingly, a logical step implies that a compulsory license should be allowed for a life
threatening situation in a developing country.253
Why should we, as Americans, care about non-domestic populations? In addition
to moral obligations, because a starving population is most likely not going to be able to
provide for itself, let alone manufacture a generic product.254 Even if they have the
facilities, obtaining the raw materials can create delays and be prohibitively expensive.255
Thus there is a need to allow the manufacture in developed countries that have adequate
resources.256
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B. Practical Aspects of Reapplication
A compulsory license would potentially reduce security in the investment of
developing new technology, as well as reduce the incentive to innovate.257 A side effect
may also be the creation of a market in which parties rely on compulsory licenses rather
than innovating. 258 Regardless, in some specifically defined instances, a carefully
distributed compulsory license will save lives and minimize any negative side effects.259
In the Plumpy’Nut instance, granting a compulsory license to a third party to create and
distribute a fixed volume of infringing product, as defined by currently outstanding
orders placed by Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), for a specifically defined
humanitarian cause, with a provision for payment to the patentee meeting certain
guidelines, will be an ideal solution.
By considering orders for products placed by NGOs as opposed to states, the
incentive for a state to overestimate its own needs and resell remaining product will be
eliminated.260 Additionally, instituting an efficient procedure for issuing a compulsory
license will allow for a timely response to a humanitarian crisis and further avoid a
bureaucratic quagmire.261 A problem unique to the RUTF industry is that demand is
unpredictable and comes in surges.262 Accordingly, although RUTFs potentially have a
lengthy shelf life, a large reserve of supply may not be practical.263 For most purposes,
the amount of RUTFs needed and the length of a humanitarian crisis are unforeseeable.264
Accordingly, any compulsory licensing statute or regulation will have to allow relief as
soon as possible.265
Also, the costs of the generic producer should also be considered.266 Generic
manufacturers costs include production, transaction, royalty, regulatory approval and
quality assurance costs.267 There should remain incentive for generic manufacturers to
produce generics or else the compulsory license will be ineffective in reaching its
goals.268 The compulsory licensing regulation also should be couched in ex ante terms to
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prevent an unwitting generic manufacturer from being held liable for patent infringement
and potentially willful infringement.269
The compensation due to a party forced to grant a compulsory license
compensation must be less than what their current profit margin is on the product, in
order to avoid a situation in which the licensor will have an incentive to produce as little
product as possible while relying on the generic manufacturer for “free” profit.270 This
will avoid an outcome like the current situation in Thailand.271 Licensors should not be
deterred from increasing their own production capacity.272 One additional consideration
is required negotiating between a licensor and licensee before issuing a compulsory
license. 273 Prior negotiation is required by TRIPS but is undefined. 274 By creating
guidelines to ensure good faith negotiation, an independent agreement may be reached
between the parties.275 A compulsory license may even act as a deterrent to bad faith
negotiating, because both parties know that a compulsory license is an option.276
Any legislation must be simple, practical, predictable, and enforceable.277 By
limiting compulsory licensing for the amount of outstanding orders placed that cannot be
fulfilled, the licensor retains an incentive to innovate while the humanitarian crisis
receives critical assistance.278 Finally, the terms “emergency” and “urgency” should be
statutorily defined, to assist in the application of any compulsory licensing negotiations
or issuance.279
CONCLUSION
By adopting a statute within these guidelines, the typical black market and free
rider problems will not exist. Because the patents falling under its purview will be geared
primarily towards developing countries, there will be little or no demand for the products
manufactured via a compulsory license. In terms of the free rider problem, once again,
the eligible patents will deal with industries and populations where there is little
innovation or research and development to begin with, and the terms of the compulsory
license will not allow a generic manufacturer to collect a windfall, thereby eliminating
the incentive to free ride.
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By making clear what categories of patents can be covered by the provision,
inventors can plan for a statutory license if they cannot meet the production, and they will
have a fixed royalty rate by which to calculate potential profit. Using this data, they can
gauge how much they would like to invest in the research of a new invention. Although
this may seem to disincentivize innovation in these fields, a guaranteed royalty serves as
consolation.
Under the proposed statutory considerations, the Plumpy’Nut problem would be
solved. After being informed that Nutriset, the single producer of Plumpy’Nut, would not
be able to fulfill its order in a timely manner, an NGO would file a report with an
advisory committee. The advisory committee would then contact Nutriset directly and
request a license on behalf of interested generic manufacturers in America. Nutriset
would be given the opportunity to negotiate individual licenses with each of the parties
for a reasonable period of time, given the severity of the humanitarian crisis. Were either
of the parties to negotiate in bad faith, or otherwise be unable to come to an agreement,
the US government would then issue a compulsory non-exclusive license to the interested
manufacturers and could temporarily suspend the patent. This license would be limited in
scope and duration, with the scope being for the identical product to be used specifically
for the humanitarian crisis, and the duration being for a specific number of units. For
example, if Nutriset was unable to fulfill an order of 25,000 tons of Plumpy’Nut, the
compulsory license would equal that amount. Given the unpredictable nature and
unpredictable time frames of humanitarian crises, this approach seemingly becomes
cumbersome, however, the government is free to issue continuous limited licenses. As
one expires, if there are additional outstanding orders, another license can be issued. If at
any point during the compulsory license timeframe Nutriset is able to accommodate the
new orders, the licensing would stop and the amount of time that had passed from the
date the license was issued would be added to the expiration date of the patent.
For a treatable and solvable condition, such as world hunger, compulsory
licensing should be allowed. The Plumpy’Nut problem blends issues of intellectual
property law with economic, political, and moral considerations in which the inventor is
trapped between a rock and a hard place, and this legislation will assist all parties
involved.
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